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SHARING POWERS WITHIN EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCES: 
RETHINKING EU ANTITRUST LAW ENFORCEMENT
Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel*
Summary: Although the establishment of competition rules forms part 
of the EU’s exclusive competences, the application and enforcement of 
those rules has always been shared consistently between the EU and 
its Member States.
The sharing of enforcement powers is conceptualised traditionally as 
a delegation of the exercise of exclusively conferred competences. The 
Court of Justice of the European Union’s case law in the context of EU 
antitrust law enforcement nevertheless raises profound questions as 
to the overall tenability of this delegation framework in this particular 
field of EU exclusive competence.
This contribution argues the traditional exclusive competences narra-
tive indeed fails to grasp the system of shared enforcement powers 
underlying EU antitrust law. Seeking to make sense of the realities of 
that system in light of EU competence doctrines, it explores the consti-
tutionality of legal policy strategies enabling a more explicit recogni-
tion of shared competences principles as an inherent part of this EU 
exclusive competence domain.
1 Introduction
Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, article 3(1)(b) 
TFEU explicitly ranks the establishment of competition rules necessary 
for the functioning of the internal market among the European Union’s 
exclusive competences.1 In practice, however, and comparable to other 
domains of EU exclusive competences, the enforcement of those rules 
had already been shared consistently between supranational and Mem-
ber State actors.2 The de facto shared nature of EU and Member States’ 
* Associate professor (chargé de cours) of European Union law, Université de Liège, Bel-
gium. PhD (KU Leuven); LLM. (Harvard), pieter.vancleynenbreugel@ulg.ac.be. I am grateful 
to the participants in the 14th Jean Monnet Seminar organised by the University of Zagreb 
on ‘Rethinking competences’ and the anonymous reviewers for comments and suggestions. 
The usual disclaimer applies.
1 See for a general introductory overview of this matter, G Monti, ‘Legislative and Execu-
tive Competences in Competition Law’ in L Azoulai (ed), The Question of Competence in the 
European Union (OUP 2014).
2 See art 89 EEC, referring to the role of Member States and Member State authorities in 
this respect; Council Regulation 17 implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty [1962] 
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enforcement powers is not as such incompatible with the idea of exclu-
sive competences.3 According to the traditional, so-called dual federalism 
interpretation of EU exclusive competences, the implementation of those 
competences can be delegated to Member States as long as the EU ex-
clusively determines the terms of such delegation. By virtue of secondary 
legislation in the realm of antitrust and State aid law, national competi-
tion authorities and national courts can effectively be called upon to join 
the effort of enforcing the EU competition law prohibitions, supported by 
diversified European Commission ‘help lines’.4
In its case law, the Court of Justice has not followed consistently the 
strict dual federalism logic that seems to underlie the secondary legisla-
tion structuring EU antitrust law enforcement.5 Although judgments on 
the existence of enforcement powers do indeed leave no or virtually no 
room for Member States beyond the tasks explicitly delegated to them 
by virtue of secondary legislation (eg the Court’s 2011 judgment in Tele2 
Polska), the Court’s assessments of the actual exercise of those powers 
by national courts or authorities (most notably the Court’s 2012 Expedia, 
2013 Allianz Hungaria and 2015 Maxima Latvija judgments) and of the 
role of those courts and authorities in the absence of specifically conferred 
or harmonised enforcement powers within the framework of EU secondary 
legislation (the 2010 Vebic, 2011 Pfleiderer and 2016 Eturas judgments) 
have followed increasingly a rather different approach. In the latter cases, 
the Court appears implicitly to have replicated or at least presumed ap-
plicable a competence pre-emption framework commonly deemed relevant 
only in the realm of ‘shared’ EU-Member State competences.
OJ L13/204 (English Special Edition, Chapter 1959-1962, 87) envisaged some cooperative 
features as well. For a cursory overview, see Grant Kelleher, ‘The Common Market Antitrust 
Laws: The First Ten Years’ (1967) 12 Antitrust Bulletin 1219.
3 On the necessary reality of shared implementation and enforcement of rules falling with-
in the ambit of EU exclusive competences, see in general, Udo Di Fabio, ‘Some Remarks on 
the Allocation of Competences between the European Union and its Member States (2002) 
39 CML Rev 1289, 1298.
4 On those help lines, recently, see Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel, ‘National Courts and EU 
Competition Law: Lost in Multilevel Confusion?’ in Nada Bodiroga-Vukobrat, Sinisa Rodin 
and Gerald Sander (eds), New Europe – Old Values? Reform and Perseverance (Springer 
2016).
5 Antitrust law generally encompasses those branches of EU competition law that prohibit 
certain kinds of anticompetitive agreements or unilateral behaviour. In EU law, art 101 
TFEU (prohibition of collusive behaviour by two or more undertakings or an association 
of undertakings) and art 102 TFEU (prohibtion of abusive behaviour by an undertaking 
occupying a dominant economic position in a relevant market) are considered the anti-
trust branches of EU competition law <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/over-
view_en.html> accessed 10 December 2016. Other branches, such as ex ante concentra-
tion control, State Aid and Services of General Economic Interest, also form part of EU 
competition law; those branches do have different features, however, also in the realm of 
law enforcement. This contribution essentially focuses on the antitrust branches and their 
enforcement as structured by the European Union.
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This contribution argues that the traditional dual federalism narra-
tive accompanying exclusive competences fails to grasp the realities of 
shared enforcement powers underlying EU antitrust law. Establishing 
that claim, the second section will document to what extent principles of 
shared competences have governed more or less implicitly the enforce-
ment of exclusive competences in the realm of EU antitrust law. Particu-
lar attention will be devoted to the shared enforcement powers regime 
and the case law on the existence and actual exercise of enforcement 
powers within or beyond the framework established by Council Regula-
tion 1/2003.6 On the basis of an overview of recent case law, it will be 
submitted that EU constitutional principles enabling the pre-emption of 
national rule interpretation or enforcement choices can, albeit with some 
caution, be recognised implicitly within the case law structuring the ex-
isting antitrust law enforcement framework. Seeking to make sense of 
those pre-emption realities in light of EU constitutional law competence 
doctrines, the third section proposes a more explicit recognition of shared 
competences principles in this particular field of EU law. Recognising 
those principles more explicitly, it will be submitted, may result in more 
clarity regarding the powers of national enforcement authorities and 
courts in their application of EU antitrust law.
It has long been acknowledged that exclusive competences are never 
completely exclusively retained at the EU level.7 The same also goes for 
the EU’s competition law competences.8 The aim of this paper is not to 
contest that finding, but rather to build upon it by looking for a con-
structive and constitutionally coherent way to acknowledge, define and 
structure the realities of shared enforcement powers in the realm of EU 
antitrust law enforcement. Beyond the particular realm of antitrust law, 
the proposed solutions offered here could also contribute to discussions 
on similar problems in other domains of EU exclusive competences. This 
may eventually result in more clarity on the scope and limits of inte-
grating shared competences principles in the framework of EU exclusive 
competences and, more generally, in a better comprehension of the ex-
act place and role of exclusive competences within the EU constitutional 
framework.
6 Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules 
on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1 (hereinafter 
referred to as Regulation 1/2003).
7 See, among others, George Bermann, ‘Competences of the Union’ in Takis Tridimas and 
Paolisa Nebbia (eds), European Union Law for the Twenty-First Century. Rethinking the New 
Legal Order Volume I Constitutional and Public Law External Relations (Hart 2004) 66.
8 See for an overview preceding the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003, Emil Paulis, 
‘Coherent Application of EC Competition Rules in a System of Parallel Competencies’ in 
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Isabella Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law Annual 
2000: The Modernization of EC Antitrust Policy (Hart 2001) 408.
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2 Exclusive competence through shared enforcement? EU antitrust 
law and dual federalism
The EU’s principled recognition of exclusive competences results 
from a classical understanding of dual federalism, in which mutually 
exclusive spheres of competences govern different fields of societal regu-
lation. Only through explicit or implicit delegations can one sphere inter-
vene in the other sphere. Such intervention is always subject to the terms 
of the delegation, which can be revoked by the delegating authority. This 
system of dual federalism can equally be found to structure the EU an-
titrust law enforcement framework established by Regulation 1/2003, 
which consistently relied on mutual cooperation, rather than exclusively 
separated competence spheres (2.1).
According to the system set up by Regulation 1/2003, national com-
petition authorities and courts have to apply articles 101 and 102 TFEU – 
prohibitions on collusive behaviour and on the abuse of a dominant eco-
nomic position – to their full extent and apply those provisions to highly 
divergent factual situations. At the same time, the Regulation limits the 
powers granted to those authorities and courts, in an attempt to ensure 
coherence in the application and interpretation of those Treaty provisions. 
Whilst this shared enforcement system reflects a delegation of exclusive 
competences to Member State actors within a domain of EU exclusive 
competence, the Court’s case law on the application and interpretation 
of articles 101 and 102 TFEU has had to work its way around practical 
enforcement difficulties generated by such a delegation approach. This 
section submits that the traditional delegation approach indeed fails to 
explain and structure the actual exercise of those powers in cases before 
national authorities and courts, as the Court’s recent case law appears 
to confirm ever more explicitly (2.2). As a result, the delegation approach 
no longer sufficiently covers the realities of shared antitrust enforcement 
shaped by the Court of Justice (2.3).
2.1 The classical interpretation of exclusive competences and dual 
federalism
The relationship between exclusive competences and dual federal-
ism has been well documented in recent EU law scholarship.9 Nothing 
would suggest that the constitutional principles underlying exclusive 
competences would not apply in relation to EU competition law in gen-
eral and EU antitrust law (articles 101 and 102 TFEU) in particular. This 
section briefly revisits the dual federalism-exclusivity framework (2.1.1) 
9 For a full overview, see Robert Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism. The Chang-
ing Structure of EU Law (OUP 2009) and the references included therein.
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and applies it to the enforcement regime set out by the above-mentioned 
Regulation (2.1.2).
2.1.1 EU dual federalism in theory
In its pioneering case law on the scope and nature of competences 
of the European Economic Community, the Court of Justice gradually 
recognised the existence of competences exclusively conferred on the Eu-
ropean Union.10 Exclusive competences represented a small sample of 
conferred competences that – given their nature – precluded any Member 
State intervention.11 The Court identified the conservation of marine bio-
logical resources under the common fisheries policy12 and the develop-
ment of a common commercial policy13 to be exclusively supranational. 
In addition, competences to conclude international agreements could 
equally fall within the then-Community’s exclusive competences. This 
was particularly the case if any steps taken outside the Community legal 
framework were incompatible with the unity of the Common Market and 
the uniform application of Community law.14 The categories of exclusive 
competences were given explicit Treaty recognition in the ill-fated Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe15 and in the Lisbon Treaty.16 In ad-
dition, those Treaties also included, for the first time, EU competition law 
and monetary policy amongst the exclusively conferred competences.17
In its case law on exclusive competences, the Court maintained that, 
within a specific area of exclusive competences, Member States lose all 
10 Armin Von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast, ‘The European Union’s Vertical Order of Compe-
tences: The Current Law and Proposals for its Reform’ (2002) 39 CML Rev 227, 241-242.
11 Koen Lenaerts, ‘Regulating the Regulatory Process: “Delegation of Powers” in the Euro-
pean Community’, (1994) 18 EL Rev 23, 30; Robert Schütze, ‘Dual Federalism Constitution-
alised: The Emergence of Exclusive Competences in the EC Legal Order’ (2007) 32 EL Rev 
1, 6.
12 Opinion 1/75 [1975] ECR 1355; Case 41/76 Donckerwolcke [1976] ECR 1921, paras 31-
35; Opinion 1/78, [1979] ECR 2871, para 44-45; Opinion 2/91, [1993] ECR I-1061, para 
8; Opinion 1/94 [1994] ECR I-5267, para XIII; Case C-347/03 Regione autonoma Friuli-
Venezia Giulia [2005] ECR I-3785, para 75.
13 Case 3/76, 4/76 and 6/76 Kramer [1967] ECR 1279, paras 39-41; Case 804/79 Com-
mission v United Kingdom [1981] ECR 1045, paras 17-18; Opinion 2/91, para 8; C-25/94 
Commission v Council [1996] ECR I-1469, para 40.
14 See among other cases, Case 22/70 Commission v Council (AETR) [1971] ECR 263, para 
28-31. See also Opinion 1/76, [1977] ECR 741 para 5. For a nuanced overview of constitu-
tional problems in that regard, see Geert De Baere, Constitutional Principles of EU External 
Relations (OUP 2008) 43-51.
15 Art I-12 (1) of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe: When the Constitution 
confers on the Union exclusive competence in a specific area, only the Union may legislate 
and adopt legally binding acts, the Member States being able to do so themselves only if so 
empowered by the Union or for the implementation of Union acts; the list of competences 
could be found in arts I-13.
16 Arts 2(1) and 3 TFEU.
17 See art 3(1)(b) and (c) TFEU.
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powers to lay down rules. The boundaries of that area of exclusivity were 
to be determined by the Court itself, having the final authority over the 
interpretation of EU law. As a result, a system of dual federalism came 
about, in which the EU and Member States operated each within the 
boundaries of their own competences.18
At the same time, two EU constitutional law features have limited 
the complete detachment of EU and Member States’ competences within 
domains of exclusivity.
Firstly, it has been argued that the scope of any EU exclusive com-
petence generally remained limited to instances where interstate trade 
would be affected in the absence of supranational intervention.19 Member 
States could theoretically regulate matters that would not affect inter-
state trade, although they would have to justify the absence of such in-
terstate effects. Given the transnational dimensions of the specific areas 
of exclusive competence, such attempts are not likely to be successful, 
as the scope of EU law could easily extend to situations that appear to 
be wholly internal to one Member State.20 In addition, it has to be ac-
knowledged that the actual exclusive competences identified all relate to 
commerce-oriented fields, which may justify why this condition can be 
extracted from the case law. Affectation of interstate trade being a condi-
tion determining the applicability of EU law, practices that do not affect 
such trade in principle fall outside the scope of EU law and therefore do 
not come within the EU’s purview. As such, the absence of effects on in-
ter-state trade still – theoretically – confers regulatory powers on Member 
States in domains falling within the EU’s exclusive competence.
Secondly, the competent EU level has been allowed explicitly or im-
plicitly to delegate the exercise or practical implementation of exclusive 
competences back to the Member States. As a result, exclusive compe-
tences could de facto remain shared in their concrete implementation 
and execution. A delegation presupposes the grant of exclusive legisla-
tive or regulatory authority by the Treaties to the European Union and 
the subsequent conditional regrant of that authority to the Member 
States.21 National legal systems would in that understanding function 
18 See for a judicial example outlining this reasoning, Opinion 1/75, [1975] ECR 1355, 
paras 11-13.
19 Ronald van Ooik, ‘The European Court of Justice and the Division of Competence in the 
European Union’ in Daniela Obradovic and Nikos Lavranos (eds), Interface between EU Law 
and National Law (Europa Law Publishing 2007) 15.
20 This would be the case especially in the realm of EU antitrust law, where the effect on the 
trade criterion has been interpreted rather extensively. For a codification of case law on that 
matter, see Commission Notice — Guidelines on the Effect on Trade Concept Contained in 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2004] OJ C101/81.
21 Schütze (n 11) 4. See also, Paul Craig, ‘Competence: Clarity, Conferral, Containment and 
Consideration’ (2004) 29 EL Rev 328. For a similar interpretation, see K Lenaerts and P Van 
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as mere agents of an exclusively competent Union, which powers can be 
taken away when the EU decides to modify the conditions of delegation.22 
Whereas such delegation has been criticised for disturbing the balance 
crafted by EU primary law between the supranational and Member State 
levels, it has been accepted also as a useful constitutional tool to make 
the EU competences system work properly.23 The Court of Justice has 
been and will continue to be called upon to assess, on a case-by-case 
basis, whether or not such delegation is permissible within the realm of 
a specific EU exclusive competence.With the entry into force of the Lis-
bon Treaty, article 2(1) TEU added that, within the sphere of exclusive 
competences, Member States also retain competence to implement Union 
acts. The added value of this reference to implementing powers remains 
unclear and most notably raises the so-far unanswered question whether 
those powers fall within the ambit of what was previously called ‘delega-
tion’ or whether they add another category to the exclusive competence 
exceptions. With no case law on the matter, it could be argued that, in 
the current state of EU law, powers of implementation are one exemple 
where the EU can delegate powers to the Member States within an exclu-
sive competence sphere. 
2.1.2  Delegating exclusive competences: enforcement-focused dual 
federalism underlying EU antitrust law
The classification of EU competition law as an exclusive competence 
implies that only the European Union institutions can determine a Eu-
ropean competition policy and shape legal provisions enabling it.24 The 
‘exclusivity’ of EU competition competences in principle also includes the 
primary competence to supervise, apply and enforce the EU competi-
tion law provisions.25 Article 105 TFEU confirms this feature, by stating 
that the Commission shall ensure the application of the principles laid 
down in articles 101 and 102, albeit in cooperation with the competent 
authorities in the Member States, which shall give it their assistance. As 
already implied in this Treaty provision, delegation of competences to the 
Member States is clearly posited as a constitutional possibility in this 
domain of EU exclusive competence. Enforcement Regulations 1/2003 in 
the realm of antitrust law and 2015/1589 in the realm of State aid could 
be considered to have delegated such powers, to a more or less limited ex-
Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union (Robert Bray & Nathan Cambien, eds, 2nd 
edition, Sweet & Maxwell 2011) 126.
22 On Member States’ agency roles especially in the realm of EU telecommunications law, 
see also Maartje De Visser, Network-Based Governance in EC Law. The Example of EC Com-
petition and EC Telecommunications Law (Wolf Legal Publishers 2008) 68-70.
23 Schütze (n 9) 174-175.
24 As this lies within the EU’s ‘area of exclusivity’, see van Ooik (n 19) 15.
25 See art 105(1) TFEU.
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tent, to national courts and – in the realm of EU antitrust law – national 
authorities.26
Regulation 1/2003 reflects the dual federalism nature of EU anti-
trust law exclusive competences.27 On the one hand, it is premised on 
a seemingly clear distinction between EU and national competition law 
provisions. Both sets of provisions belong to two different spheres of com-
petences; national authorities can apply national antitrust law provisions, 
the European Commission EU competition law provisions. On the other 
hand, they equally confirm that national authorities can act, in circum-
stances determined by EU law itself, as agents of the European Commis-
sion when they are applying EU antitrust law provisions, thus limiting the 
autonomy of Member States’ authorities in this respect.
The first limb – an exclusive area of competence – has been con-
firmed explicitly by the Court of Justice. In its 2013 Toshiba judgment, 
the Court of Justice confirmed this position, albeit implicitly. The case 
concerned the application and extent of the principle of ne bis in idem 
as a matter of EU law in general and EU competition law in particular.28 
Specific questions revolved around whether or not a national competition 
authority was able to prosecute and fine an undertaking on the basis of 
its national competition law, even though the same behaviour had al-
ready been the subject of a Commission inquiry.29 The case was all the 
more relevant since the Czech national competition authority in that case 
relied on its national competition law to prosecute behaviour preceding 
the accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union.30 In its judg-
ment, the Court most famously hinted at the existence of a specific ne 
bis in idem principle in EU antitrust law.31 At the same time, however, it 
also confirmed the dual federalism nature of EU antitrust law enforce-
ment, confirming that EU and national antitrust law provisions belong 
to two different spheres of competence. The Court specifically stated that 
Regulation 1/2003 does not imply that the opening of a proceeding by 
the Commission permanently and definitively removes the national com-
26 For the State aid framework, see Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 
laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union [2015] OJ L248/9.
27 James Venit, ‘Brave New World: The Modernization and Decentralization of Enforcement 
under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty’ (2003) 40 CML Rev 545, 555; Katarina Pijetlovic, 
‘Reform of EC Antitrust Enforcement: Criticism of the New System Is Highly Exaggerated’ 
(2004) 25 ECLR 356, 357.
28 On this judgment in detail, see Wouter Devroe, ‘How General Should General Principles 
Be? Ne Bis in Idem in EU Competition Law’ in Ulf Bernitz, Xavier Groussot and Felix Shu-
lyok (eds), General Principles of EU Law and European Private Law (Kluwer 2013).
29 Case C-17/10 Toshiba Corporation and Others [2012] ECR I-0000, para 29.
30 Case C-17/10 Toshiba Corporation and Others, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, 
para 3.
31 Case C-17/10 Toshiba Corporation and Others, para 79.
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petition authorities’ power to apply national antitrust law when EU law 
does not govern a particular factual setting.32 Within its own scope of 
application, national antitrust law therefore remains relevant and readily 
applicable. 
In its January 2016 DHL Express judgment, the Court also con-
firmed this position in relation to leniency submission procedures at EU 
and Member State levels.33 Again, the Court acknowledged that EU and 
national leniency procedures serve different objectives and therefore can 
be applied separately and in parallel. They thus belong to different areas 
of competences at either EU or Member State level.
At the same time, Regulation 1/2003 also envisages the partial inte-
gration of national authorities and courts in the EU’s envisaged enforce-
ment system. Those features of the Regulation seemingly fit the second 
limb of dual federalism theory – a  delegation of powers to national au-
thorities and courts. In that regard, article 3 imposes a duty on national 
competition law authorities to apply EU competition law in cases that af-
fect trade between Member States.34 Member States can also continue to 
apply their national antitrust law provisions in parallel with the EU pro-
visions, yet the application of those national competition law provisions 
may not lead to the prohibition of agreements which may affect trade 
between Member States but which do not restrict competition within the 
meaning of article 101(1) of the Treaty or which fulfil the conditions of 
article 101(3), or which are covered by a block exemption regulation.35 In 
practice, this means that what EU law deems legal cannot subsequently 
be deemed illegal under Member States’ antitrust laws. At the same time, 
however, Member States shall not be precluded from adopting and ap-
plying on their territory stricter national laws which prohibit or sanction 
unilateral conduct engaged in by undertakings. In that situation, nation-
al authorities are granted an explicit authorisation to apply national laws 
prohibiting behaviour that would be deemed legal under EU law.
According to the dual federalism logic underlying EU exclusive com-
petences, national competition authorities and courts can operate only 
32 Case C-17/10, Toshiba Corporation and Others, paras 89-90.
33 Case C-428/14 DHL Express (Italy) Srl and DHL Global Forwarding (Italy) SpA v Autorità 
Garante della Concorrenza e del mercato [2016] ECR I-0000, para 44.
34 Art 3(1) Regulation 1/2003. On the scope of concurrence from a national law perspec-
tive, see Ginevra Bruzzone and Marco Boccaccio, ‘Taking Care of Modernization after the 
Start-Up: A View from a Member State’ (2008) 31 World Competition 89.
35 Art 3(2) Regulation 1/2003. See Andreas Klees, ‘Breaking the Habits: The German Com-
petition Law after the 7th Amendment to the Act against Restraints of Competition (GWB)’ 
(2006) 7 German Law Journal 399, 406 on the origins of that rule. Art 3(3) holds that the 
regime of parallel application does not preclude the application of provisions of national law 
that predominantly pursue an objective different from that pursued by arts 101 and 102 of 
the Treaty. Such rules would seem to fall outside the exclusive ambit of EU competition law.
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by virtue of the EU institutions mandating them to do so. The system set 
up by Regulation 1/2003 does indeed seem to confirm that such a delega-
tion mechanism structures the powers of national authorities and courts 
within that Regulation. The delegation nature of such competences ap-
pears in three different features incorporated within that Regulation.
Firstly, articles 11-13 of Regulation 1/2003 seeks to structure and 
streamline the national competition authorities’ and the European Com-
mission’s powers to initiate and terminate investigations and infringe-
ment proceedings. Where competition authorities of two or more Member 
States are aware of the potential existence of restrictive agreements, the 
fact that one authority is dealing with the case shall be sufficient ground 
for the others to reject the complaint. The same goes for complaints re-
ceived in relation to agreements that have already been dealt with by an-
other competition authority.36 Any suspension or termination is overseen 
by the European Commission. The latter may itself terminate or suspend 
a pending investigation if a national authority has dealt with the case and 
is considered to be better placed in doing so.37 At the same time, article 
11(6) of Regulation 1/2003 provides an instrument for the Commission 
to maintain control over the application of EU competition law.38 It states 
that the initiation by the Commission of supranational investigative pro-
cedures shall ‘relieve the competition authorities of the Member States of 
their competence to apply Articles [101] and [102] of the Treaty’.39 Theo-
retically, the Commission could therefore decide to take over a case from 
a national authority. Article 11(6) nevertheless requires that the national 
competition authority which will be relieved from duty shall be consulted 
by the Commission. In practice, the Commission considers article 11(6) 
to be an ultimate remedy in cases where a national competition author-
ity’s position threatens to frustrate the coherent application of EU com-
petition law.40
36 Art 13(2) of Regulation 1/2003.
37 Art 13 (1) of Regulation 1/2003.
38 This provision does not consider the Commission’s deference to national authorities’ 
decisions once the national authority has adopted a decision. A long-standing question 
in that regard concerned whether or not a national authority’s decision applying arts 101 
and 102 TFEU is binding on the European Commission. For an early argument in favour 
of that position, see John Temple Lang, ‘European Community Constitutional Law and 
the Enforcement of Community Antitrust Law’ in Barry Hawk (ed), Antitrust in a Global 
Economy. Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute 1993 (Kluwer 1994) 
584. The binding scope of national authorities’ decisions nevertheless remains problematic 
and uncertain, again highlighting the Commission’s remaining fundamental role as an EU 
competition law supervisor in that respect.
39 Kris Dekeyser and Maria Jaspers, ‘A New Era of ECN Cooperation. Achievements and 
Challenges with a Special Focus on Work in the Leniency Field’ (2007) 30 World Competi-
tion 3, 9 refer to this action as the de-seizing of a national authority.
40 Dekeyser and Jaspers (n 39) 9.
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Secondly, article 5 of the Regulation limits the scope and scale of de-
cisions to be adopted by national competition authorities when enforcing 
EU antitrust law. According to that provision, Member States’ authorities 
may, acting on their own initiative or on a complaint, require that an 
infringement be brought to an end, order interim measures, accept com-
mitments, impose fines, periodic penalty payments or any other penalty 
provided for in their national law. Where on the basis of the information 
in their possession the conditions for prohibition are not met, they may 
likewise decide that there are no grounds for action on their part. In its 
Tele2 Polska judgment, the Court confirmed, on the basis of a strict in-
terpretation of this provision, that a national competition authority can-
not take a decision stating that a practice does not restrict competition 
within the meaning of article 102 TFEU in a case in which it has found, 
after conducting proceedings, that the undertaking did not engage in 
abusive behaviour.41 Article 5 offers an exhaustive list of decisions na-
tional authorities can adopt when applying EU antitrust law. Only the 
Commission can adopt a decision finding there has been no infringement 
of article 102.42 Such kinds of decisions have not been delegated to the 
national authorities and therefore remain with the exclusive competence 
domain of the competent EU institutions.
Thirdly, the role of national courts is streamlined and extended ac-
cording to a similar dual federalism logic. According to article 6, national 
courts shall apply articles 101 and 102 TFEU in their entirety. At the 
same time, national courts ought to take measures in ensuring the co-
herence of EU competition law enforcement. In so doing, the courts can 
rely on both the Court of Justice and the European Commission to en-
sure that EU competition law does not significantly diverge across dif-
ferent jurisdictions. To that extent, Regulation 1/2003 offers innovative 
mechanisms aimed at establishing a direct cooperative link between the 
European Commission and national courts requiring its assistance on 
competition law matters. Most innovatively, article 15(3) of Regulation 
1/2003 provides a right for the Commission to submit written observa-
tions to courts of the Member States. With the permission of the court in 
question, it may also make oral observations.43 EU law also grants a simi-
lar right to national competition authorities,44 any wider powers granted 
for these authorities under national law notwithstanding.45 It follows from 
those provisions that the Commission or national authorities are allowed 
41 Case C-375/09 Prezes Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów v Tele2 Polska sp. 
zoo, devenue Netia SA [2011] ECR I-3055, para 27.
42 Case C-375/09 Tele 2 Polska, para 29.
43 Art 15(3) of Regulation 1/2003.
44 Art 15(3) of Regulation 1/2003.
45 Art 15(4) of Regulation 1/2003.
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to46 intervene in national court proceedings when the coherent applica-
tion of articles 101 and 102 so requires.47 Unlike the authoritative inter-
pretation of EU law by the EU courts, the opinion of the Commission does 
not legally bind a national court.48 The legal effect and practical impact 
of the opinion on the outcome of a national dispute in practice largely 
depend on national procedural law.49 In order for those administrative 
actors meaningfully to intervene in Member States judicial proceedings, 
access to (parts of) the case file is deemed necessary. Regulation 1/2003 
therefore provides that the Commission may request the relevant court 
of the Member State to transmit or ensure the transmission to them of 
any documents necessary for the assessment of the case.50 The trans-
mission of documents can only take place for the purposes of preparing 
the intervention.51 A Commission intervention will in principle deal with 
the economic and legal analysis of the facts underlying the case pending 
before the national court.52
The three above-mentioned features of Regulation 1/2003 sum-
marised here highlight that the system of shared EU antitrust law en-
forcement has been coined essentially as specific applications of the ‘del-
egation of exclusive competences’ framework established within the EU’s 
classical dual federalism framework. The involvement of national courts 
and authorities is meant to facilitate the coherent implementation of an 
exclusive field of EU competences, in which the Commission plays a pri-
mary role. National authorities and courts have, to a significant extent, 
been integrated in the Commission-led enforcement system, but remain 
46 Regulation 1/2003 refers to ‘may’. The Commission is not obliged to, but is merely en-
titled to intervene. As such, it has discretion to intervene in particular instances. See also 
Kathryn Wright, ‘The European Commission’s Own “Preliminary Reference Procedure” in 
Competition Cases’ (2010) 16 European Law Journal 736, 744 on the legal nature of the 
Commission opinion. See also para 19 Commission Notice on the co-operation between 
the Commission and the courts of the EU Member States in the application of Articles 81 
and 82 EC [2004] OJ C101/54 (hereinafter 2004 Courts Notice), which states that ‘[i]n 
case the Commission has been contacted by any of the parties in the case pending before 
the court on issues which are raised before the national court, it will inform the national 
court thereof, independent of whether these contacts took place before or after the national 
court’s request for co-operation’.
47 Art 15(3) of Regulation 1/2003. Para 32 2004 Court Notice.
48 Para 29 of the 2004 Courts Notice.
49 Para 9 of the 2004 Courts Notice.
50 In return, art 15(1) of Regulation 1/2003 states that courts of the Member States may 
ask the Commission to transmit to them information in its possession or its opinion on ques-
tions concerning the application of the EU competition rules. In that instance, the national 
court decides how to treat the Commission’s opinion and the value attached to it in compli-
ance with national procedural law. See Wright (n 46) 747 for a contrast with the Amicus 
opinion in art 15(3) and discussed here.
51 Para 33 of the 2004 Courts Notice.
52 Para 32 of the 2004 Courts Notice. In stating so, the Commission’s involvement is exten-
sive compared to the Court’s, which can only intervene with regard to legal analysis. See art 
267 TFEU and Wright (n 46) 753.
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subservient to the Commission, which acts as a primus super pares with-
in this system. 
2.2  Beyond dual federalism delegation in the judicial interpretation 
of articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
Regulation 1/2003 established a seemingly firm dual federalism-
oriented enforcement mechanism, in which some powers have been del-
egated to national authorities, without the Commission losing overall 
control and authority over EU antitrust enforcement. At the same time, 
and as a part of the cooperation mechanisms envisaged by Regulation 
1/2003, national authorities or courts can be called upon to apply EU 
competition law without the Commission’s direct involvement as a mar-
ket supervision body in its own right, giving them potentially some liberty 
in the substantive law interpretation and application of EU antitrust law 
in cases where the Commission decides not to intervene.
The Court has been confronted with such cases, in which it seem-
ingly deviated from the clear-cut dual federalism system established so 
far in the context of Regulation 1/2003 and the implementation of the 
cooperation tools covered by it. The Court’s recent case law in the Expe-
dia, Allianz Hungaria and Maxima Latvija judgments confirms this, hint-
ing at a more nuanced approach towards shared EU antitrust enforce-
ment than the dual federalism understanding seems to offer (2.2.1). In 
addition, case law on the powers of national competition authorities and 
national courts in fields that have not or not entirely been covered by 
Regulation 1/2003 also hints at a similar deviation from the classical 
dual federalism logic sketched in the previous section. The judgments in 
Vebic, Pfleiderer and Eturas are most instructive in this respect (2.2.2).
2.2.1 ‘Substantive law’ autonomy?
Expedia presented the Court with the first opportunity to consid-
er the role of national competition authorities within the enforcement 
system of Regulation 1/2003. In the case at hand, the French competi-
tion authority decided to commence infringement proceedings against an 
agreement between Expedia and the French Railways which had as its 
object to limit competition in on-line travel agency services. The question 
raised was whether the national authority could consider this agreement 
to be prohibited on the basis of article 101(1) TFEU, now that such an 
agreement would likely benefit from so-called de minimis exceptions es-
tablished by the European Commission. According to such exceptions, 
the Commission committed itself not to prosecute matters that did not 
have a sufficiently appreciable effect on competition.53 Those exceptions 
53 Recital 5, Communication from the Commission — Notice on agreements of minor im-
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being posited in a non-binding Commission guidance document, ques-
tions arose regarding their application to national competition authori-
ties. In light of Regulation 1/2003’s strict adherence to a dual federalism 
framework and to maintaining unity and coherence in the application of 
articles 101 and 102 by national authorities and courts as delegates of 
the EU institutions, it could have been expected that the Court would 
rule that those non-binding documents had to be applied by national 
authorities.
Rather surprisingly, the Court in this case maintained that the de 
minimis notice does not contain any reference to declarations by the com-
petition authorities of the Member States that they acknowledge the prin-
ciples set out therein and that they will abide by them. The Court addi-
tionally submitted that it did not follow from the objectives of that notice 
that it is intended to be binding on the competition authorities and the 
courts of the Member States.54 As a result, article 3 of Regulation 1/2003 
was to be interpreted as not precluding a national competition authority 
from applying article 101(1) TFEU to an agreement between undertakings 
that may affect trade between Member States, but that does not reach the 
thresholds specified by the Commission in its de minimis notice, provided 
that that agreement constitutes an appreciable restriction of competition 
within the meaning of that provision.55 As a result, national authorities 
only have to apply conditions and thresholds read directly into article 
101 TFEU by the Court of Justice itself.
The Expedia judgment thus made clear that national competition 
authorities remain at liberty to make their own assessments on the basis 
of article 101 TFEU, without necessarily being bound by Commission 
soft law guidance documents. Through the looking glass of EU constitu-
tional law, such reasoning can also be understood as a confirmation that 
national authorities and courts remain free to rule independently on the 
applicability and scope of articles 101 and 102 TFEU, in the absence of 
binding EU rules on the matter. The implications of such implicit legal rea-
soning are twofold. On the one hand, it implies that Member States’ au-
thorities and courts have to abide by EU legislation, be it of a general or 
of an individual nature. To the extent that EU secondary law provisions 
clearly impose a certain kind of procedure or behaviour, those rules have 
to be followed and the national authorities and courts will act as EU insti-
tutions’ delegates in this respect. It can be submitted that the same goes 
for binding decisions adopted by the European Commission in individual 
cases. To the extent that the Commission considered certain practices 
portance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (De Minimis Notice) [2014] OJ C291/1.
54 Case C-226/11 Expedia Inc v Autorité de la concurrence ea [2012] ECR I-0000, paras 
27-30.
55 Expedia (n 54) para 38.
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to be anticompetitive, the same or similar practices investigated by na-
tional authorities, even when relating to different undertakings, will have 
to be deemed anticompetitive as well by those authorities or by national 
courts, which already follows from article 3(1) of Regulation 1/2003.
On the other hand, however, in the absence of such rules, it can be 
submitted that national authorities and courts remain at liberty to in-
terpret articles 101(1) and 102 TFEU autonomously in accordance with 
the basic conditions and requirements. The judgment also shows that 
the intervention options by the Commission in no way restrain the na-
tional judge to come up with an autonomous decision; only in instances 
where binding decisions have to be invoked will a national judge be called 
upon to apply those rules of law. In practice, and given the highly factual 
nature of antitrust cases, this will mean that national authorities and 
judges will retain their rule-interpretation autonomy to a large extent.
The Court’s 2013 judgment in Allianz Hungaria confirmed this in-
terpretation. In that judgment, the Court held that a national author-
ity can consider a set of agreements to be violating article 101 TFEU if, 
following a concrete and individual examination of the wording and aim 
of those agreements and of the economic and legal context of which they 
form a part, it is apparent that they are, by their very nature, injurious to 
the proper functioning of normal competition on one of the two markets 
concerned.56 To the extent that EU competition law is applicable, the na-
tional authority is responsible for making that assessment within those 
framework conditions.57 It is also up to that authority or to a national 
court to consider the restriction to be one ‘by object’ or one ‘by effect’, 
both of them prohibited by article 101 TFEU but requiring a different 
analytical toolbox. In Maxima Latvija, the Court further clarified this po-
sition, ruling that commercial lease agreements may be considered to be 
an integral part of an agreement having the ‘effect’ of preventing, restrict-
ing or distorting competition within the meaning of article 101(1) TFEU, 
from which it is found, after a thorough analysis of the economic and legal 
context in which the agreements occur and the specificities of the relevant 
market, that they make an appreciable contribution to the closing-off of 
that market.58 Again, national authorities or courts would have to make 
that assessment, applying the conditions set out by the Court, but com-
ing to an independent conclusion as to whether those conditions have 
been fulfilled.
In all the above-mentioned cases, the Court acknowledges that na-
tional authorities and/or courts retain some leeway in the absence of 
56 Case C-32/11 Allianz Hungária Biztosító Zrt and Others v Gazdasági Versenyhivatal 
[2013] ECR I-0000, para 51.
57 Allianz Hungária (n 56) para 33.
58 Case C-345/14 SIA Maxima Latvija» v Konkurences padome [2015] ECR I-0000, para 29.
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clear-cut precedent EU law decisions on the specific matter. Although 
Member States have been delegated the task to apply and interpret EU 
antitrust law as established by the EU institutions, including the Eu-
ropean Commission and the Court of Justice, Regulation 1/2003 also 
envisaged situations in which no such precedent decisions exist. In those 
situations, open-ended provisions can in principle be interpreted by na-
tional authorities and national courts, although the Commission and 
Court of Justice retain the final authority over such decisions. In practice, 
this amounts to situations where national authorities and courts retain 
autonomous decision-making powers, until the Commission or Court of 
Justice rules differently. This regime, which in constitutional law terms 
resembles a framework of ‘pre-emption’ of Member State level compe-
tences (Member States remain competent unless and until supranational 
law extends to, replaces and contradicts earlier regulations or decisions 
adopted at Member State level). It follows from this that national authori-
ties and courts can adopt decisions, within the open-textured framework 
left by articles 101 and 102 TFEU, which could nevertheless be pre-empt-
ed by later supranational decisions. Such pre-emption of decisions or 
powers is in principle inherent to a regime of shared competences rather 
than exclusive competences. As the case law mentioned here demon-
strates, the Court seems to accept this as a reality in EU antitrust law 
enforcement, especially in instances of substantive law where Regulation 
1/2003 did not intervene to regulate EU-Member State interactions.
2.2.2  Beyond classical dual federalism in the absence of procedural 
harmonisation
Even more remarkably, the line of case law grounded in some kind 
of pre-emption of competences in the realm of the substantive law ap-
plication and interpretation of EU antitrust law can also be found in 
relation to procedural issues that have not as such been covered by the 
provisions of Regulation 1/2003. The judgments in Vebic, Pfleiderer and 
Eturas confirm this approach.
In Vebic, the Court was asked to interpret article 35(1) of Regulation 
1/2003. According to that provision, ‘the Member States shall designate 
the competition authority or authorities responsible for the application of 
Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty in such a way that the provisions of 
this regulation are effectively complied with’. Whilst those authorities may 
include courts, the Regulation requires that some distinction between 
prosecuting and decision-making bodies of such a judicial authority are 
provided for.59 The conditions thus imposed seek to ensure that nation-
al authorities can effectively fulfil their roles as agents of the European 
59 Case C-439/08 Vlaamse federatie van verenigingen van Brood- en Banketbakkers, Ijs-
bereiders en Chocoladebewerkers (VEBIC) VZW [2010] ECR I-12471, para 62.
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Union and the implementation of the EU exclusive competences flowing 
therefrom. In its judgment, the Court ruled that article 35 implies that 
a national competition authority should be entitled to participate, as a 
defendant or respondent, in proceedings before a national court which 
challenge a decision that the authority itself has taken.60 As a result, na-
tional authorities have to be structured so as to enable the effective imple-
mentation of EU antitrust law. At the same time, EU law does not impose 
specific conditions on the format and functioning of national competition 
authorities. Quite the contrary, those authorities can continue to function 
in the absence of more specific binding obligations imposed by the EU leg-
islator, albeit within the confines set out by the Court of Justice through 
its interpretation of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.
In Pfleiderer, the Court was asked to rule on whether or not a claim-
ant in a private action for damages caused by anticompetitive behaviour 
could have access to confession statements filed under a leniency appli-
cation and held by the national competition authority. The Court stated 
that the competition authorities of the Member States and their courts or 
tribunals applying articles 101 and 102 TFEU have to ensure that those 
provisions are applied in the general interest.61 In the absence of binding 
regulation under European Union law on the subject, it is for Member 
States to establish and apply national rules on the right of access by 
persons adversely affected by a cartel, to documents relating to leniency 
procedures.62 The Court went on to state that these national rules cannot 
however jeopardise the effective application of EU competition law.63 The 
effective application of article 101 TFEU through leniency programmes 
could be compromised if documents relating to a leniency procedure were 
disclosed to persons wishing to bring an action for damages, even if the 
national competition authorities were to grant the applicant for leniency 
exemption from the fine which they could have imposed.64 As a result, 
a person involved in an infringement of competition law would be de-
terred to pass on information to public enforcement authorities,65 result-
ing in the diminished attractiveness of leniency programmes overall. At 
the same time, actions for damages before national courts can make a 
significant contribution to the maintenance of effective competition in the 
European Union.66 To that extent, it is necessary for a national judge to 
weigh the respective interests in favour of disclosure of the information 
60 VEBIC (n 59) para 64.
61 Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-5161, para 19.
62 Pfleiderer (n 61) para 23.
63 ibid, para 24.
64 ibid, para 26.
65 ibid, para 27.
66 ibid, para 29.
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and in favour of the protection of that information provided voluntarily 
by the applicant for leniency.67 Weighing should take place on a case-
by-case basis, taking into account all the relevant factors of the case.68 
EU law does not as such preclude a person who has been adversely af-
fected by an infringement of EU competition law and is seeking to obtain 
damages from being granted access to documents relating to a leniency 
procedure involving the perpetrator of that infringement. However, it is 
for the courts and tribunals of the Member States, on the basis of their 
national law, to determine the conditions under which such access must 
be permitted or refused by weighing the interests protected by EU law.69 
In those circumstances, national courts effectively have to balance 
whether or not access should be granted. As the Court held subsequently 
in Donau Chemie, EU law not only permits such balance in the absence 
of binding EU rules, it also pre-empts Member States from maintaining 
legislative provisions that limit such balancing.70 The system set up by 
this case law confirms the pre-emption approach. Member States can 
keep balancing mechanisms in existence, but cannot as such restrict 
any such balancing that would go against the framework established by 
the Court of Justice. Only binding procedural rules at the EU level would 
be able to restrict such balancing. In Directive 2014/104/EU, which is 
currently being transposed, limits to such balancing have indeed been 
imposed as a matter of EU law.71 Prior to the adoption of those rules, 
national judges were entirely free to complete autonomous balancing as-
sessments.72
Eturas presents the latest confirmation of a similar pre-emption 
approach. The case concerned a Lithuanian online platform for travel 
agents, through which messages regarding pricing policies were distrib-
uted, which were subsequently incorporated in the technical algorithms 
67 ibid, para 30.
68 ibid, para 31.
69 ibid, para 32. The German judge refused access to the requested documents in the na-
tional case. See Amtsgericht Bonn, Pfleiderer/Bundeskartellamt, judgment of 18 January 
2012, 51 Gs 53/09 AG Bonn.
70 Case C-536/11 Donau Chemie [2013] ECR I-0000, para 35. For more reflections on dis-
closure of documents induced by national judges, see Elsbeth Beumer and Agis Karpetas, 
‘The Disclosure of Files and Documents in EU Cartel Cases: Fairytale or Reality?’ (2012) 8 
European Competition Journal 123, 129-130.
71 Art 6(6) of Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European 
Union [2014] OJ L349/1.
72 See on that shift, Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel, ‘Embedding Procedural Autonomy: The 
Directive and National Procedural Rules’ in Maria Bergström, Marios Iacovides and Magnus 
Strand (eds), Harmonising EU Competition Litigation. The New Directive and Beyond (Hart 
2016) 113-115.
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governing the platform’s functioning.73 Although the case includes many 
other novelties relating to online platforms and EU antitrust law,74 the 
Court equally clarified the roles of national authorities in the absence 
of more specific binding procedural rules. It held that it remains for the 
national court to examine – on the basis of the national rules governing 
the assessment of evidence and the standard of proof – whether, in view 
of all the circumstances before it, the dispatch of a message, such as that 
at issue in the main proceedings, may constitute sufficient evidence to 
establish that the addressees of that message were aware of its content.75 
At the same time, the Court explicitly acknowledged that the presump-
tion of innocence precludes the referring court from considering that the 
mere dispatch of that message constitutes sufficient evidence to establish 
that its addressees ought to have been aware of its content. In doing so, 
the Court established a limit within which Member States’ interpreta-
tive autonomy can be exercised safely. Once again, it can be inferred 
from this judgment that Member States’ authorities and courts remain at 
liberty to organise evidence procedures, albeit within some limits set at 
the EU level. Those limits effectively prevent Member States from taking 
independent action. Beyond those limits, however, national procedural 
and enforcement competences remain fully in existence. 
All the cases touched upon here demonstrate again that, in the ab-
sence of binding procedural rules imposing clear obligations on Member 
States’ authorities and courts as a matter of EU law, those authorities 
and courts remain at liberty to apply national law rules or their own as-
sessment schemes. They will only be pre-empted from doing so if EU 
law imposes additional conditions or to the extent that new binding pro-
cedural rules are being adopted at the EU level. Again, it would seem 
that principles of pre-emption – traditionally at stake only in relation to 
shared competences spheres – are functioning against the background 
of the implementation of EU antitrust enforcement, embedded within the 
EU’s exclusive competences.
2.2.3 A brief comparison of both strands of case law
It appears from the previous section that Regulation 1/2003 estab-
lished, at least in some respects, a classical dual federalism enforcement 
system, on the basis of which national authorities and courts are being 
considered agents or delegates of the EU institutions whenever they are 
required to apply EU antitrust law. Clear obligations imposed on them 
and additional intervention opportunities granted to the European Com-
73 Case C-74/14 ‘Eturas’ UAB and Others v Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos taryba 
[2016] ECR I-0000, para 6-11.
74 ibid, para 43.
75 ibid, para 33.
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mission seem to indicate that national authorities and courts cannot 
exercise EU antitrust enforcement competences in a truly autonomous 
way. The Court’s interpretation of the mechanisms thus outlined in Reg-
ulation 1/2003 also confirms that position.
At the same time, however, in the absence of a specific procedural 
harmonisation mechanism or in the substantive law determination and 
resolution of a specific case, it is clear that Member States’ authorities 
and courts retain significant decision-making autonomy, which will only 
be pre-empted by future contrary interpretations by the Court of Justice 
or the Commission. As a result, in those instances, principles governing 
the pre-emption of Member States’ competences appear to underlie the 
Court’s case law, despite EU competition law being an exclusive compe-
tence, in which case pre-emption is considered not to be at issue.
The question can therefore legitimately be raised whether more ex-
plicit recognition of EU pre-emption principles applicable in relation to 
shared competences can be used to structure, limit and enable the sys-
tem that seems to be underlying the above-mentioned cases implicitly. 
The next section will address that question.
3 Rethinking EU antitrust law dual federalism beyond delegation
The above-mentioned overview of cases demonstrates that the tradi-
tional ‘delegation’-‘exclusive competence’ principles no longer seem to fit 
fully the operations of the EU antitrust enforcement system. In fact, the 
Court of Justice rather seems to presume the existence of pre-emption 
principles underlying and governing the relationship between EU institu-
tions and national authorities in the application of EU antitrust law. As a 
result, questions can be raised regarding the existence and applicability 
of such principles in EU law in general.
This section argues that such principles do indeed exist and are 
applicable to EU antitrust enforcement (3.1). Such a finding confirms 
the argument made in other fields of EU law that the European Union is 
indeed moving from a dual federalism to a more cooperatively structured 
federal-like entity. Acknowledging this ‘cooperative federalism’ reality 
within the field of EU antitrust enforcement raises questions on the need 
for more explicit constitutional recognition of pre-emption strategies in-
herent in EU law that could apply in this domain. Building on that need, 
the final part of this section offers some antitrust-specific suggestions for 
bringing the dual federalism framework on a par with shared enforce-
ment realities (3.2).
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3.1 From delegation to pre-emption in EU antitrust enforcement
The case law examples outlined in the previous section seem to re-
flect principles regarding the pre-emption of regulatory powers prevailing 
in EU shared competences (3.1.1). It will be submitted that the two types 
of pre-emption types generally considered to apply in European Union 
law can indeed effectively be found underlying this case law (3.1.2).
3.1.1 Pre-emption as a technique underlying EU shared competences
Traditionally, a federally structured system of shared regulatory 
competences presupposes a constitutional set of conflict rules capable of 
addressing potential conflicts between multiple governance levels.76 Prin-
ciples of federal supremacy and pre-emption have traditionally sought to 
avert these conflicts.77 The EU’s constitutional system poses no exception 
in that regard. The Court of Justice accepted that EU law cannot only 
produce direct effect in national legal orders,78 but that direct effect also 
implies the primacy of EU law over national law in the case of conflicts 
between a supranational and a national norm.79 In a system of shared 
competences, the emphasis on primacy also almost naturally implies a 
principle of federal pre-emption.80 Pre-emption in that understanding en-
compasses a set of principles determining to what extent81 national law 
can be set aside when supranational legislation is enacted.82
Although pre-emption is at the heart of EU legal integration, EU law 
is not governed by a singular or clearly structured pre-emption doctrine. 
76 On that issue, see Gerald Conway, ‘Conflicts of Competence Norms in EU Law and the 
Legal Reasoning of the ECJ’ (2010) 11 German Law Journal 967.
77 Schütze refers to supremacy and pre-emption. See Robert Schütze, ‘Supremacy without 
Pre-emption? The Very Slowly Emergent Doctrine of Community Pre-emption’ (2006) 43 
CML Rev 1023, 1024. The principle of sincere cooperation ensures a similar connection in 
an ever more integrated institutional realm and therefore could serve as both a regulative 
principle determining the extent of competence division from an institutional deliberation 
perspective as well as an operational principle governing its exercise. See Lawrence Gorm-
ley, ‘Some Further Reflections on the Development of General Principles of Law within Ar-
ticle 10 EC’ in Ulf Bernitz, Joachim Nergelius and Cecelia Gardner (eds), General Principles 
of EC Law in a Process of Development (Kluwer 2008) 310.
78 Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos [1963] ECR 3 (English Special Edition, 1).
79 Case 6/64 Costa Enel [1964] ECR 585; Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 
mbH [1970] ECR 1125.
80 For an introductory overview of pre-emption as a principle of federal law in the US, see 
Mark D Rosen, ‘Contextualizing Preemption’ (2008) 102 Northwestern University Law Re-
view 781. See also Daniel Farber, ‘Federal Preemption of State Law: The Current State of 
Play’ UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1740043 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1740043&rec=1&srcabs=1778363> accessed 24 May 2016.
81 Schütze (n 77) 1039. See also António Goucha Soares, ‘Pre-Emption, Conflicts of Power 
and Subsidiarity’ (1998) 23 EL Rev 132; Daniel Cross, ‘Pre-Emption of Member State Law 
in the European Economic Community. A Framework for Analysis (1992) 29 CML Rev 447.
82 Schütze (n 77) 1033.
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On the contrary, three types of pre-emption can simultaneously be iden-
tified within EU law. The actual conditions governing their applicability 
and scope appear to differ from EU policy field to policy field.83 It follows 
that different pre-emption strategies can accompany specific secondary 
legislation initiatives or the pragmatic interpretation of certain legal bas-
es included in the Treaties.84 In his work on pre-emption, Schütze dis-
tinguished between three typologies of pre-emption in that regard: field 
pre-emption, rule pre-emption and obstacle pre-emption.
Field pre-emption refers to an explicit veto by a federal legislative or 
regulatory body for States to enact norms in a given policy field. By virtue 
of legislative or regulatory action taken in a field, supranational or federal 
law is considered to have a jurisdictional monopoly to the detriment of 
federated entities, irrespective of whether these entities’ norms directly 
conflict with the enacted supranational rules.85 Field pre-emption techni-
cally establishes exclusive competences at the supranational or federal 
level. As a result, field pre-emption results in a sphere of exclusivity being 
created. It would not be entirely unimaginable that within such a sphere 
of exclusivity, the supranational level would again delegate some powers 
to the Member States, which would then be considered as agents of the 
supranational level.86
Rule pre-emption on the other hand takes the existence of shared 
competences as its starting point.87 Although jurisdiction remains shared, 
rule pre-emption presupposes national rules will be trumped by directly 
conflicting supranational rules.88 From that perspective, the determina-
tion of ‘direct conflicts’ will be crucial to determine the regulatory scope 
granted to both supranational and national rules.89 The Court of Justice, 
relying on the principle of supremacy, determines the existence of such 
conflicts and offers the remedy of non-application of conflicting Member 
State law provisions in this particular situation.90
83 On that argument, see Schütze (n 9) 187.
84 For that pragmatic view, see also Joseph Weiler, ‘The Community System: The Dual 
Character of Supranationalism’ (1981) 1 YEL 267, 295.
85 Schütze (n 77) 1035.
86 As art 2(1) TFEU itself makes clear in its definition of exclusive competences.
87 Konstadinides refers to this kind of pre-emption as implied pre-emption always solved in 
favour of EU law, at least in the absence of clarifying secondary Union legislation, see Theo-
dore Konstadinides, Division of Powers in European Union Law. The Delimitation of Internal 
Competence between the EU and the Member States (Kluwer 2009) 170.
88 Schütze (n 77) 1037.
89 For the nascence of the pragmatic framework in that regard, see Weiler (n 84) 278.
90 For examples in this regard, Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v 
Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 629; Case 102/79 Commission v Belgium [1980] ECR 1487, 
para 15; Case 149/79 Commission v Belgium [1980] ECR 3903, para 19; Case C-473/93 
Commission v Luxemburg 1996 ECR I-3255, para 26; Case C-285/98 Tanja Kreil v Bundes-
republik Deutschland [2000] ECR I-105, para 23; Case C-119/05 Ministero dell’Industria, 
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Obstacle pre-emption allows supranational law to strike down na-
tional rules that constitute obstacles to the objectives to be realised by 
the supranational level. Stated otherwise, this doctrine allows Member 
States to continue adopting rules, but only to the extent that they do not 
impede the full effectiveness of supranational rules. National law could in 
that regard be pre-empted even when these national rules do not directly 
conflict with, but merely impose obstacles on, the implementation of su-
pranational provisions.91 According to this doctrine, the Court of Justice 
has to determine, in more or less general or specific terms, the existence 
of the conditions which have to be fulfilled for such an indirect conflict 
to be in place.92
3.1.2 Pre-emption in the Court’s antitrust enforcement case law
These three types have, above all, been identified throughout EU 
shared competences frameworks.93 The lack of a general pre-emption 
framework and the pragmatic application of pre-emption strategies in 
the European Union at the same time hint at the existence of constitu-
tionally fluid boundaries between exclusive and shared competences. To 
the extent that the European Union accepts field pre-emption to take 
place in certain policy areas, competences can shift from the shared to 
the de facto exclusive sphere of EU competences. Applying this prag-
matic understanding of pre-emption strategies to the realm of EU exclu-
sive competences, no EU constitutional provision would seem to impede 
the inverse operation from EU exclusive competences to de facto shared 
competences. This is all the more so regarding the implementation and 
application of EU law in Member States’ legal orders, where the EU con-
sistently relies on Member States administrations to enforce European 
Union law. As more enforcement powers are being ‘delegated’ within the 
realm of EU exclusive competences, pre-emption principles generally un-
derlying shared competences can implicitly enter the realm of EU compe-
tence demarcation debates. The Court’s case law on the application of ar-
ticles 101 and 102 TFEU by national competition authorities and courts 
precisely demonstrates this option. It should nevertheless be clear at the 
outset that, just as in its case law on shared competences,94 the Court 
del Commercio e dell’Artigianato v Lucchini SpA, formerly Lucchini Siderurgica SpA [2007] 
ECR I-6199.
91 See Schütze (n 77) 1036.
92 The Court does not always refer to pre-emption in this regard; nevertheless, the prin-
ciple of effectiveness in relation to national procedural rules constitutes a good example 
in this respect. See Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel, ‘Procedural Autonomy as Integration-rein-
forcement: The Court of Justice of the European Union and National Procedural Choices’ in 
Wouter Werner and Lukasz Gruszczynki (eds), Standards of Review in International Courts 
and Tribunals (OUP 2014) 175.
93 Schütze (n 77) 1040.
94 See on that argument Schütze (n 77) 1038.
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does not explicitly refer to doctrines of pre-emption. The techniques ap-
plied by it do however resemble or approach some of the pre-emption 
categories defined by the literature and outlined in the previous section.
The most obvious example of pre-emption-like principles being ap-
plicable relates to the case law on antitrust enforcement procedures in 
the absence of harmonisation measures. Vebic and Eturas clearly indi-
cate that Member States remain free to establish institutional structures 
and procedural rules enabling EU antitrust enforcement, as long as those 
national rules do not conflict indirectly with the goals of EU antitrust en-
forcement set at the supranational level. In case of a conflict with those 
goals (non-participation of the authority in proceedings against its own 
decisions or the applicability of rules governing standard of proof that do 
not enable an infringement of articles 101 and 102 to be effectively prov-
en), Member States will be pre-empted from keeping those rules in place. 
The existence and avoidance of such conflicts depends entirely on the 
Court finding them and on it requesting the Member States to address 
them in particular situations. From the point of view of predictability, 
Member States have no certainty as to whether such an indirect obsta-
cle with vague and likely modifiable goals of EU antitrust enforcement 
will have to be remedied. EU antitrust literature shows that the goals of 
EU antitrust law in general, as well as the goals of EU antitrust enforce-
ment in particular, are subjected to highly diverging interpretations.95 In 
acting so and in implicitly identifying conflicts between EU policy goals 
and Member State rules, the Court firmly applies techniques that can be 
classified as obstacle pre-emption techniques. In this understanding, ob-
stacle pre-emption offers the Court of Justice a competence division tech-
nique, allowing EU law to intervene in and address some choices made 
at the Member State level that seem to conflict with evolving EU goals.
The Pfleiderer and Donau Chemie judgments confirm the obstacle 
pre-emption approach taken in the context of the absence of procedural 
harmonisation, but also reflect the limited scope of this approach once 
harmonisation takes place. In projecting a balancing approach regard-
ing access to documents relevant in a private damages action, the Court 
considered Member States’ legislation impeding such a balance to be an 
obstacle to the realisation of one of the EU antitrust enforcement goals. 
95 For an overview of debates in this regard, see Rein Wesseling, The Modernisation of EC 
Antitrust Law (Hart 2000) 80-83; Laura Parret, ‘Shouldn’t We Know What We are Protect-
ing? Yes We Should! A Plea for a Solid and Comprehensive Debate about the Objectives of 
EU Competition Law and Policy’ (2010) 6 European Competition Journal 339; Pinar Akman, 
‘Consumer Welfare and Article 82 EC: Practice and Rhetoric’ (2009) 32 World Competition 
71; Barbara Jedličková, ‘One Among Many or One Above All? The Role of Consumers and 
Their Welfare in Competition Law’ (2012) 33 ECLR 568. For a different opinion, see Renato 
Nazzini, The Foundations of European Union Competition Law. The Objective and Principles 
of Article 102 (OUP 2012).
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Such an approach only holds in the absence of supranational rules 
which strike a more specific balance themselves. The adoption of Direc-
tive 2014/104/EU on damages actions and the clear prohibition to grant 
access to certain types of documents included therein will limit the scope 
of balancing to be conducted. In doing so, it will change the parameters 
within which obstacle pre-emption identified in both judgments will take 
place. In so stating, the Directive confirms a delegation of some balanc-
ing powers to national judges in individual damages actions. This shows 
that obstacle pre-emption techniques employed by the Court serve as a 
precursor to govern the exclusive EU antitrust enforcement field in the 
absence of more specific procedural harmonisation initiatives. Once sec-
ondary legislation imposes boundaries on Member States’ actors’ com-
petences, the latter will have to operate within the confines set by that 
legislation, limiting the scope of obstacle pre-emption.
To the extent that secondary legislation has already set the param-
eters, the case law still hints at some kind of pre-emption coming into 
play. According to the Court’s case law in Expedia, Allianz Hungaria and 
Maxima Latvija, Member States remain free to assess and apply open-
textured EU legal norms to specific factual circumstances in the absence 
of a previously issued binding decision by the Commission or the Court of 
Justice in the same or a similar case. In its case law, the Court has given 
some interpretative room to Member States by excluding soft law from 
the scope of binding EU law decisions. The fact that Member States are 
obliged, as a matter of article 3 of Regulation 1/2003, to apply articles 
101 and 102 TFEU in full means that they have been delegated some 
interpretative autonomy in doing so. In the exercise of such delegated 
powers, Member States can interpret articles 101 and 102 TFEU autono-
mously in the absence of a directly conflicting interpretative decision. 
Such a decision would create a supranational rule that effectively re-
strains the interpretative autonomy that Regulation 1/2003 in principle 
grants to Member States’ authorities and courts.
That competence division system resembles the rule pre-emption 
features identified above in relation to shared competences. The existence 
of a ‘direct conflict’ triggering the pre-emption of Member States’ inter-
pretative freedom depends on the existence of Commission decisions or 
CJEU judgments having previously interpreted articles 101 or 102 TFEU 
regarding the same or a similar set of facts. As a result, such rule pre-
emption is embedded within the delegation framework and conditional on 
the absence of an EU decision. As such, the Court truly presupposes a 
pre-emption approach, but only in the absence of specific interpretative 
guidance granted by the EU institutions. One could therefore say that the 
Regulation 1/2003 system is built on a framework of rule-interpretation 
pre-emption. This demonstrates that the powers delegated to Member 
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States are rather fluid and depend on the EU institutions having adopted 
binding decisions; this seems to be the application of the very pre-emp-
tion techniques that underlie shared competences.
Although the Court does not recognise it explicitly, both strands of 
case law demonstrate that some kind of pre-emption techniques support 
the system set out by Regulation 1/2003. The Court embeds such tech-
niques firmly within a domain of exclusive competence, by virtue of EU 
secondary legislation granting or delegating powers to the Member State 
level. This again demonstrates the fluidity between categories of exclu-
sive and shared competences. The EU’s particular system of ‘cooperative 
federalism’ does not seem to tolerate a rigid division between exclusive 
and shared competences;96 the applicability, albeit implicitly, of shared 
competences pre-emption techniques within an exclusive competence 
domain in essence confirms that position in relation to EU antitrust en-
forcement.
3.2 Embedding pre-emption techniques in EU exclusive competences? 
To the extent that obstacle and rule(-interpretation) pre-emption 
techniques indeed implicitly underlie the Court’s antitrust enforcement 
case law, questions can be raised genuinely about the need to recognise 
the presence of such techniques in the realm of exclusive EU antitrust 
competences more explicitly as a matter of EU constitutional law. More 
generally, explicit recognition of such pre-emption techniques within a 
domain of EU exclusive competences may offer better insights in what it 
still means to have an exclusive competence in today’s European Union. 
Explicitly integrating pre-emption principles in the realm of exclusive 
competences may not only benefit the coherence and predictability of EU 
antitrust enforcement.
The current implicit references to pre-emption in the Court’s anti-
trust enforcement case law and the uncertainties surrounding it support 
the belief that a more explicit recognition may be useful in order better to 
understand the roles of different actors within the realm of exclusive EU 
competences. An explicit recognition would not only guarantee a clearer 
and more predictable delineation of EU and Member States’ competences 
in the enforcement of EU antitrust law, but would also give both supra-
national and Member States’ authorities and jurisdictions tools to better 
determine their own roles within the EU’s antitrust enforcement system.
With a view to promoting a more explicit recognition of pre-emption 
possibilities, four legal policy strategies can be envisioned. It can be ques-
tioned legitimately whether and to what extent the four proposed legal 
policy solutions would have any practical value to the application and 
96 Schütze (n 9) 188.
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interpretation of EU law. Given the lack of clarity on the scope and even 
necessity of a pre-emption doctrine in EU law in general, the proposals 
above all aim to clarify and better tailor EU enforcement realities to the 
principles underlying the EU’s core constitutional features. Above and 
beyond the more explicit recognition of EU pre-emption realities and the 
increase in legal certainty flowing therefrom, it could be argued that their 
practical value would be limited indeed. At the same time, however, the 
four strategies offered here would allow more direct and focused reflec-
tion, from practical realities upwards, on the existence, scope and limits 
of pre-emption in EU antitrust enforcement and EU law more generally. 
As such, they would at least open up debates – which can be continued 
before and resolved by the EU Courts in litigation settings – on how to 
ensure an appropriate application of the EU’s competence principles.
Firstly, the existence of pre-emption as a principle governing the 
exercise of ‘delegated’ exclusive competences could be recognised directly 
within the Treaty framework itself. Pre-emption does not feature in the 
Treaty framework and has only been identified implicitly in the Court’s 
case law.97 An adaptation of the Treaties appears to be, from the point of 
view of predictability and legal certainty, the most appropriate format to 
ensure the constitutionality of pre-emption as applied within the realm 
of EU exclusive antitrust competences. The feasibility of this solution can 
nevertheless be questioned rightfully, as the scope of pre-emption doc-
trines and techniques lacks any explicit recognition in the field of shared 
competences as well.98 Given that shared competences are the natural 
territory for pre-emption techniques and given that any reference to them 
is lacking in the Treaty provisions on shared competences, it would be 
rather strange to include an explicit reference to them in relation to ex-
clusive competences in the absence of a fuller recognition of pre-emption 
as a principle also underlying shared competences.
Secondly, the Court of Justice could develop a more explicit pre-
emption theory, resulting in a few clear-cut guidelines for national actors 
on how to deal with situations that potentially conflict with EU anti-
trust law. In doing so, a doctrine comparable to the primacy/supremacy 
doctrine could be more explicitly developed. As has been remarked on 
numerous occasions, however, the Court has so far refrained from do-
ing this in the realm of shared competences. It would seem unlikely that 
the specific situation of EU antitrust enforcement would be taken as a 
starting point more fully to develop this doctrine as a matter of EU con-
stitutional law. In addition, it can also be argued that it is not the Court’s 
97 See the pioneering work of Michel Waelbroeck, ‘The Emergent Doctrine of Community 
Pre-emption: Consent and Redelegation’ in Eric Stein and Terrance Sandalow (eds), Courts 
and Free Markets: Perspectives from the United States and Europe (Clarendon 1982) 458.
98 As Schütze confirmed recently; see Schütze (n 77) 1032.
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role to develop general theories of pre-emption, but rather to apply and 
interpret EU law in particular circumstances.
Thirdly, a related alternative solution could consist in interpret-
ing the principle of sincere cooperation more explicitly as containing a 
bundle of pre-emption techniques. Sincere cooperation presupposes that 
both the federal or supranational level and the federated levels engage in 
cooperation and consultations with a view to allowing a workable division 
of competences to emerge from regulatory practice. The principle of sin-
cere cooperation serves as a constitutional catch-all provision governing 
mutual duties and obligations between the national and supranational 
levels.99 It is also the foremost constitutional expression of cooperative 
federalism.100 In accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation out-
lined in article 4(3) TEU, both supranational and national authorities are 
called upon to assist each other in fulfilling the tasks which flow from the 
Treaties. Member States shall in particular assist the Union and refrain 
from any action or inaction that could jeopardise the Union’s actions.
The Court of Justice held in Zwartveld that Union institutions are 
also bound sincerely to cooperate with national courts regarding the pro-
vision of information in competition law matters.101 An extrapolation of 
that judgment, in conjunction with article 12 of Regulation 1/2003 could 
be read as a duty imposed on the Commission to share particular docu-
ments with Member States’ authorities as well. In the interest of sincere 
cooperation between different governance levels enjoying parallel compe-
tences, it could therefore also be argued that clear pre-emption principles 
and limits would serve to enable sincere cooperation truly to take shape 
in the specific EU antitrust enforcement framework. It would therefore 
not be entirely impossible that the Court relies on the principles of sin-
cere cooperation to clarify and limit the scope of permissible pre-emption 
within the domain of EU antitrust enforcement. Given the very open-
ended nature of that principle, such inclusion would not seem to be im-
possible constitutionally, granted that the Court would be willing indeed 
to take this step. Recent case law does not seem to show a willingness 
to invoke this principle. It could nevertheless be considered a viable way 
forward at a time when the acknowledgment of more explicit pre-emption 
principles would be considered more necessary.
Fourthly, the most appropriate solution therefore seems to be a 
more explicit direct recognition of pre-emption principles or techniques 
99 On the principle’s operation in that regard, see John Temple Lang, ‘The Development by 
the Court of Justice of the Duties of Cooperation of National Authorities and Community 
Institutions under Article 10 EC’ (2007-2008) 31 Fordham International Law Journal 1483.
100 Robert Schütze, ‘From Rome to Lisbon: “Executive federalism” in the (New) European 
Union’ (2010) 47 CML Rev 1385, 1398.
101 See Case C-2/88 Zwartveld [1990] ECR I-3365, para 17.
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in instruments of secondary legislation. As Regulation 1/2003 in this re-
spect contains specific conflict rules regarding the interaction and parallel 
application of EU and national competition law, it would not seem un-
imagineable to include similar rules governing the interpretation of open-
ended Treaty antitrust provisions by national authorities and courts in 
the absence of a binding decision incorporating a specific interpretation 
in the same or similar cases. As others have proposed to revise Regula-
tion 1/2003 on other points,102 it can be submitted that a more explicit 
recognition of rule-interpretation pre-emption principles presents a fea-
sible solution. If that solution were opted for, a clear-cut rule should be 
inserted in the Regulation.
A proposed provision to that extent could be phrased as follows: 
1. National competition authorities will apply articles 101 and/
or 102 TFEU within the boundaries set by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union, this Regulation and other binding instru-
ments of secondary legislation. In the absence of relevant prece-
dent decisions, national authorities and courts can interpret arti-
cles 101 and/or 102 TFEU in accordance with their meaning and 
content. This provision does not impede requests for opinions 
to or interventions from the European Commission in particular 
cases, in accordance with other provisions of this Regulation. 
2. In the absence of specific procedural requirements imposed 
by this Regulation or any other instrument of EU law, Member 
States are responsible to organise their institutional frameworks 
and procedures so as to accommodate EU law claims. National 
choices made in this regard cannot constitute obstacles to the 
realisation of EU antitrust enforcement goals as outlined in this 
Regulation.103
Whilst it may appear that this provision restates the obvious in the 
wake of the Court’s judgments in Expedia, Allianz Hungaria and Maxima 
Latvija, the addition of this principle clearly as a matter of EU secondary 
legislation would empower Member States’ authorities and courts more 
directly whenever they want to apply articles 101 and 102 TFEU in com-
pliance with the enforcement system set up by Regulation 1/2003, but 
102 Wouter Wils, ‘Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003 – A Retrospective’ (2013) 4(4) Journal of 
European Competition Law & Practice 293.
103 To the extent that a provision of this kind would be inserted in Regulation 1/2003, the 
EU institutions could equally hold that Commission guidance documents would be binding 
on national authorities. Such acknowledgment would nevertheless trigger new questions on 
the invocability and binding nature of EU soft law, which would go beyond the confines of 
this contribution. On those problems in a different context, see, recently, Merijn Chamon, 
‘Le recours à la soft law comme moyen d’éluder les obstacles au développement des agences 
de l’UE’ (2014) Revue de l’Union européenne 152.
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in the absence of a binding EU precedent in the specific factual setting. 
As such, it would above all provide more legal certainty than is the case 
today. Such a provision would additionally also enable the Court more 
explicitly and comfortably to set the legal boundaries of the pre-emption 
approach when being asked to do so in the context of a specific case situ-
ation.
The inclusion of this provision in the Regulation would at the same 
time seem to presuppose that clarity exists on the goals of EU antitrust 
enforcement. As mentioned earlier, those goals are embedded more gen-
erally in discussions about the goals of EU competition law. Those goals 
tend to be rather fluid and shifting over time. Even the insertion of a pro-
vision such as the one proposed could not impede a Member State rule 
considered to be compatible with EU law today from being deemed an ob-
stacle against the background of shifting antitrust enforcement goals. At 
the same time, the recognition of pre-emption techniques at the very least 
would make it clearer that Member States do retain their proper regula-
tory and interpretation powers, even against a background of changing 
enforcement goals.
4 Conclusion
The EU system of competence conferral remains rather fluid, de-
spite different categories of competences now being recognised explic-
itly in the TFEU. This paper has highlighted that this fluidity may have 
an impact on the way in which EU law principles traditionally limited 
to shared competences can also come into play as meaningful constitu-
tional benchmarks in the assessment and interpretation of EU exclusive 
competences. To that extent, the paper has analysed the ways in which 
EU antitrust enforcement mechanisms have been given shape.
The establishment of competition rules falls within the exclusive 
competences of the European Union. As a result, EU institutions are in 
principle responsible for the determination and application of EU com-
petition law rules. Member States will only be competent in competition 
law matters outside the realm of EU competition law or to the extent that 
EU institutions have delegated certain competences or powers to Mem-
ber States’ actors. In the realm of EU antitrust enforcement, Regulation 
1/2003 and the supporting mechanisms enabling the decentralised en-
forcement of articles 101 and 102 TFEU at first sight clearly confirm this 
delegation approach. In doing so, the Court of Justice confirms that EU 
competences cannot be captured in clear categories of exclusive, shared 
or complementary competences each governed by their own constitution-
al logic.
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To that extent, this contribution has explored the EU law possibil-
ities for a more explicit recognition of the applicability of pre-emption 
techniques in the realm of EU exclusive antitrust competences and be-
yond. On a practical level, whereas the explicit recognition of pre-emption 
within the Treaty framework or by the Court appears to be a desirable op-
tion, it was submitted that the acknowledgment of such techniques more 
explicitly within a delegating instrument such as Regulation 1/2003 
would be a first step in the right direction. On a more theoretical level, the 
conceptualisation of a competence as exclusive clouds the understanding 
of the Member States’ necessary role in the administration and enforce-
ment of EU exclusive competences. The contribution has therefore also 
proposed a more tailored interpretation of the principle of sincere coop-
eration in the context of EU exclusive competences as a means to bring 
pre-emption or pre-emption like techniques firmly within the ambit of 
those competences and remaining within the current constitutional set-
tlement reflected in the founding Treaties.
